Question 1  Boogle

Boogle is a social networking website that's looking into expanding into other domains. Namely, they recently started a map service to try their hand at fusing that with social media. The URL for the main website is https://www.boogle.com, and they want to host the map service at https://maps.boogle.com.

Q1.1 For each of the following webpages, determine whether the webpage has the same origin as http://boogle.com/index.html, and provide a brief justification.

i. https://boogle.com/index.html

ii. http://maps.boogle.com


Solution:

i. False. https://boogle.com/index.html and http://boogle.com/index.html do not have the same origin, since their protocols (https) and (http) are different.

ii. False. http://maps.boogle.com and http://boogle.com/index.html do not have the same origin, since their domains (maps.boogle.com) and (boogle.com) are different. The same-origin policy performs string matching on the protocol, domain, and port.

iii. True. The paths are not checked in the same-origin policy.

iv. False. http://maps.boogle.com:8080 and http://boogle.com/index.html do not have the same origin, because their ports (8080) and (80) are different. Note that if the port is not specified, the port defaults to 80 for http and 443 for https.

Q1.2 Describe how to make a cookie that will be sent to only Boogle's map website and its subdomains.

Solution: Set the domain parameter of the cookie to .maps.boogle.com

Q1.3 How can Boogle ensure that cookies are only transmitted encrypted so eavesdroppers on the network can’t trivially learn the contents of the cookies?

Solution: Set the secure flag on each cookie.
Q1.4 Boogle wants to be able to host websites for users on their servers. They decide to host each user’s website at https://[username].boogle.com. Why might this not be a good idea?

**Solution:** A malicious user could set cookies that would be sent to other users’ sites as well as the entire .boogle.com domain. Also, any cookies meant for boogle.com will go to the malicious user.

Q1.5 Propose an alternate scheme so that Boogle can still host other users websites with less risk, and explain why this scheme is better.

Note: It is okay if the user sites interfere with each other, as long as they cannot affect official Boogle websites.

**Solution:** Boogle should create a new domain exclusively for user hosted content, like https://[username].boogleusercontent.com. This way, user sites cannot set cookies that will affect all boogle domains due to the cookie setting policy. This is known as a cookie tossing attack, and is one of the reasons why github hosts user sites on github.io instead of github.com (see https://blog.github.com/2013-04-09-yummy-cookies-across-domains/).
**Question 2  Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)**

In a CSRF attack, a malicious user is able to take action on behalf of the victim. Consider the following example. Mallory posts the following in a comment on a chat forum:

```html
<img src="http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=mallory"/>
```

Of course, Patsy-Bank won’t let just anyone request a transaction on behalf of any given account name. Users first need to authenticate with a password. However, once a user has authenticated, Patsy-Bank associates their session ID with an authenticated session state.

Q2.1 Explain what could happen when Alice visits the chat forum and views Mallory’s comment.

**Solution:** The img tag embedded in the form causes the browser to make a request to http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=mallory with Patsy-Bank’s cookie. If Alice was previously logged in (and didn’t log out), Patsy-Bank might assume Alice is authorizing a transfer of 1000 USD to Mallory.

Q2.2 Patsy-Bank decides to check that the Referer header contains patsy-bank.com. Will the attack above work? Why or why not?

**Solution:** In most cases, it will solve the problem since the Referer header will contain the blog’s URL instead of patsy-bank.com.

However, not all browsers send the Referer header, and even when they do, not all requests include it.

Q2.3 Describe one way Mallory can modify her attack to always get around this check

**Solution:** She can have the link go to a URL under Mallory’s control which contains patsy-bank.com such as patsy-bank.com.attacker.com or attacker.com/attack?dummy=patsy-bank.com. Then this page can redirect to the original malicious link. Now the Referer header will pass the check.

Another solution, is if the Patsy-Bank has a so-called “open redirect” http://patsy-bank.com/redirect?to=url, the referrer for the redirected request will be http://patsy-bank.com/redirect?to=.... An attacker can abuse this functionality by causing a victim’s browser to fetch a URL like http://patsy-bank.com/redirect?to=http://patsy-bank.com/transfer..., and from patsy-bank.com’s perspective, it will see a subsequent request for http://patsy-bank.com/transfer... that indeed has a Referer from patsy-bank.com.
Q2.4 Recall that the **Referer** header provides the full URL. HTTP additionally offers an **Origin** header which acts the same as the **Referer** but only includes the website domain, not the entire URL. Why might the **Origin** header be preferred?

**Solution:** Leaking the entire URL can be a violation of privacy against users. As an example, consider Alice transferred money by visiting http://patsy-bank.com/transfer?amt=1000&to=bob and subsequently went to a website under an attacker’s control - now the attacker has learned the exact amount of money Alice sent and to who. The **Origin** header would only leak that Alice was at the patsy-bank.com.

As a sidenote not directly related to the question, the **Origin** is a very useful way to solve the CSRF problem since it makes it much easier for multiple, trusted sites to make some action. For example, Patsy-Bank might trust http://www.trustedcreditcardcompany.com to directly transfer money from a user’s account. This is a use-case that the CSRF token-based solution doesn’t support cleanly.

Q2.5 Almost all browsers support an additional cookie field **SameSite**. When **SameSite=strict**, the browser will only send the cookie if the requested domain and origin domain correspond to the cookie’s domain. Which CSRF attacks will this stop? Which ones won’t it stop? Give one big drawback of setting **SameSite=strict**.

**Solution:** It stops almost all CSRF attacks, except those involving open redirects from the website in question or if the website itself has an XSS vulnerability.

However, setting **SameSite=strict** can greatly limit functionality since any external links that require a user to be logged in won’t work. For instance, consider a friend sends you a Facebook link via email, clicking on that link will require you to sign in again since your session cookie wasn’t sent with the request.
**Question 3  Clickjacking**

In this question we’ll investigate some of the click-jacking methods that have been used to target smartphone users.

Q3.1 In many smartphone browsers, the address bar containing the page’s URL can be hidden when the user scrolls. What types of problems can this cause?

**Solution:** If the real address bar is hidden, it’s much easier for an attacker to create and place their own on the website, fooling victims into thinking they’re browsing on sites they aren’t. JavaScript can scroll the page, hiding the address bar as soon as the page loads, allowing an attacker complete freedom to place a fake address bar.

For more info, check out https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/upsec/tech/full_papers/niu/niu_html/niu_html.html (section 4.2.2)

Q3.2 Smartphone users are used to notifications popping up over their browsers as texts and calls arrive. How can attackers use this to their advantage?

**Solution:** By simulating an alert or popup on the website, an attacker can fool users into clicking malicious links. This can allow attackers to pose as phone applications such as texting apps or phone apps, which enables phishing.

Q3.3 QR codes are used for various wide-ranging applications, for example: ordering at a restaurant, or providing a job link at a career fair. Can you think of any security vulnerabilities that might exist with the widespread use of QR codes?

**Solution:** QR codes placed in public are perfect targets for people with malicious websites. They can post their own, pretending to be links to useful websites, and instead linking to phishing sites. Or, they can modify and paste over existing codes, which only keen observers would notice.