DNS over TCP (SU20 Final Q6) (20 points)

Standard DNS uses UDP to send all queries and responses. Consider a modified DNS that instead uses TCP for all queries and responses.

Q1.1 (3 points) Which of the following does DNS over TCP guarantee against a man-in-the-middle attacker? Select all that apply.

☐ (A) Confidentiality
☐ (B) Integrity
☐ (C) Authenticity
☐ (D) None of the above

Q1.2 (3 points) Compared to standard DNS, does DNS over TCP defend against more attacks, fewer attacks, or the same amount of attacks against an on-path attacker?

☐ (G) More attacks
☐ (H) Same amount of attacks
☐ (I) Fewer attacks

Q1.3 (5 points) What fields does an off-path attacker not know and need to guess correctly to spoof a response in DNS over TCP? Assume source port randomization is enabled. Select all that apply.

☐ (A) TCP sequence numbers
☐ (B) Name server port
☐ (C) Recursive resolver port
☐ (D) DNS A records
☐ (E) DNS NS records
☐ (F) None of the above

Q1.4 (3 points) Is the Kaminsky attack possible on DNS over TCP? Assume source port randomization is disabled.

☐ (G) Yes, because the attacker only needs to guess the DNS Query ID
☐ (H) Yes, but we consider it infeasible for modern attackers
☐ (I) No, because the attacker cannot force the victim to generate a lot of DNS over TCP requests
☐ (J) No, because TCP has integrity guarantees

☐ (K) —
☐ (L) —
Q1.5 (3 points) Recall the DoS amplification attack using standard DNS packets. An off-path attacker spoofs many DNS queries with the victim’s IP, and the victim is overwhelmed with DNS responses. Does this attack still work on DNS over TCP?

- (A) Yes, the attack causes the victim to consume more bandwidth than the standard DNS attack
- (B) Yes, the attack causes the victim to consume less bandwidth than the standard DNS attack
- (C) No, because the DNS responses no longer provide enough amplification
- (D) No, because the attacker cannot force the server to send DNS responses to the victim

Q1.6 (3 points) What type of off-path DoS attack from lecture is DNS over TCP vulnerable to, but standard DNS not vulnerable to? Answer in five words or fewer.
Q2  Caltopia DNS (SP21 Final Q8)  (21 points)
EvanBot is trying to determine the IP address of caltopia.com with DNS. However, some attackers on the network want to provide EvanBot with the wrong answer.

Assumptions:
- Each attacker is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker between their two neighbors on the diagram above.
- No attackers can perform a Kaminsky attack.
- Standard DNS (not DNSSEC) is used unless otherwise stated.
- No private keys have been compromised unless otherwise stated.
- In each subpart, both EvanBot’s cache and the local resolver’s cache start empty.
- Each subpart is independent.

Clarification during exam: Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.
In each subpart, EvanBot performs a DNS query for the address of caltopia.com.

Q2.1 (4 points) In this subpart only, assume the attackers only passively observe messages.
Which of the attackers would observe an A record with the IP address of caltopia.com as a result of EvanBot’s query? Select all that apply.

☐ (A) Attacker 1  ☐ (C) Attacker 3  ☐ (E) None of the above
☐ (B) Attacker 2  ☐ (D) Attacker 4  ☐ (F) ——

Q2.2 (3 points) Which of the attackers can poison the local resolver’s cached record for cs161.org by injecting a record into the additional section of the DNS response? Select all that apply.

Note: Attacker 1 has intentionally been left out as an answer choice.

☐ (G) Attacker 2  ☐ (I) Attacker 4  ☐ (K) ——
☐ (H) Attacker 3  ☐ (J) None of the above  ☐ (L) ——
Q2.3 (4 points) Assume that the resolver and the name servers all validate DNSSEC, but EvanBot does not validate DNSSEC. Which of the attackers can poison EvanBot’s cached record for caltopia.com by modifying the DNS response? Select all that apply.

- [ ] (A) Attacker 1
- [ ] (B) Attacker 2
- [ ] (C) Attacker 3
- [ ] (D) Attacker 4
- [ ] (E) None of the above

Q2.4 (5 points) In this subpart only, assume the attackers only passively observe messages.

Assume that everyone validates DNSSEC. Which of the following records would Attacker 3 observe as a result of EvanBot’s query? Select all that apply.

- [ ] (G) DS record with hash of the .com name server’s public KSK
- [ ] (H) DS record with hash of the caltopia.com name server’s public KSK
- [ ] (I) A record with the IP address of caltopia.com
- [ ] (J) A record with the IP address of the caltopia.com name server
- [ ] (K) DNSKEY record with the .com name server’s public KSK
- [ ] (L) None of the above

Q2.5 (3 points) Assume that everyone validates DNSSEC, and the caltopia.com name server’s private KSK has been compromised (i.e. all attackers know the caltopia.com name server’s private KSK). No other private keys have been compromised.

Can EvanBot trust that they received the correct IP address of caltopia.com?

- [ ] (A) Yes, because the ZSK that signs the A record has not been compromised
- [ ] (B) Yes, because the trust anchor (the root’s KSK) has not been compromised
- [ ] (C) No, because the compromised KSK can be used to sign a malicious A record
- [ ] (D) No, because the compromised KSK can be used to sign a fake ZSK that is used to sign a malicious A record

- [ ] (E) —
- [ ] (F) —

Q2.6 (2 points) True or False: DNSSEC prevents Attacker 4 from learning the IP address of caltopia.com.

- [ ] (G) True
- [ ] (H) False
- [ ] (I) —
- [ ] (J) —
- [ ] (K) —
- [ ] (L) —
Q3  Peter Parker in CS161: Training Wheels Protocol  (7 points)
There is an off-path attacker trying to poison Peter’s DNS cache. This attacker wishes to trick Peter’s recursive resolver into caching their IP address as the address of cs161.org. Assume Peter does not use DNSSEC and that Bailiwick checking is implemented.

Q3.1 (2 points) Select all true statements:

☐ The attacker must send a DNS response before the real nameserver responds to poison the cache

☐ The attacker must break symmetric key encryption to poison the cache

☐ The attacker must break asymmetric key encryption to poison the cache

☐ The attacker would not be able to poison the recursive resolver’s cache if Peter’s recursive resolver and all nameservers used DNSSEC

☐ None of the above

Q3.2 (2½ points) Which of the following domains, when visited by Peter using his browser, would give the attacker a non-negligible chance to poison the cache for cs161.org? Select all that apply.

☐ https://cs161.org

☐ http://cs161.org

☐ http://nonexistentdomain.cs161.org

☐ http://www.google.com

☐ http://nonexistentdomain.google.com

☐ None of the above
Q3.3 (2½ points) Now assume that Peter is a frequent visitor of cs161.org and google.com and that his recursive resolver has already cached those two domains. Which of the domains below may still give the attacker a non-negligible chance to poison the cache when Peter visits that domain? Select all that apply.

- [ ] https://cs161.org
- [ ] http://cs161.org
- [ ] http://nonexistentdomain.cs161.org
- [ ] http://www.google.com
- [ ] http://nonexistentdomain.google.com
- [ ] None of the above